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NAFTA and u.s. Jobs
The U.s., Canada, and Mexico continue to nego-
tiate the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). By lowering the countries' trade barr-
iers and reducing foreign investment restrictions
in Mexico, NAFTA is widely expected to stimu-
late an expansion of trade and to raise real in-
comes in the three economies. However, there
is concern that including Mexico in NAFTA will
lead to large losses in U.s. manufacturing jobs
and reductions in U.s. real wages. This Weekly
Letter discusses how the closer economic rela-
tionship between the U.S. and Mexico under
NAFTA is expected to affect the U.S. labor mar-
ket by surveying the results of recent studies.
Impact on U.S. jobs
Some observers are concerned that NAFTA may
encourage U.s. manufacturers to relocate to
Mexico in order to exploit lower wages in Mex-
ico, which were estimated at one-seventh those
in the U.s. in 1992, at the prevailing exchange
rate. u.s. imports from Mexico would then in-
crease, eliminating U.s. jobs. However, a large
number of studies conclude that any job losses
from increased U.S. imports will be more than
offset by job gains associated with increases in
U.s. exports to Mexico. Three reasons may be
offered for this finding. First, lowering Mexican
trade barriers under NAFTA is expected to have a
larger impact than lowering U.S. trade barriers,
because Mexican trade barriers are currently
higher. (At the beginning of the 1990s Mexican
tariffs averaged 10 percent and u.s. tariffs 4 per-
cent.) Second, Mexico is expected to increase its
imports of U.S.-made capital and intermediate
goods as a result of u.s. foreign direct investment
inflows. Third, increases in wealth are expected
to increase Mexican demand for imports from
the U.s. (The U.s. accounts for roughly 75 per-
cent of Mexico's imports.) The tendency for Mex-
ico to have trade deficits with the U.S. is already
apparent as a result of recent economic liberali-
zation measures adopted by Mexico. Mexico's
trade balance with the U.S. switched to a deficit
of $1.6 billion in 1991 and $4.9 billion in 1992,
compared to surpluses averaging nearly $5
billion between 1985 and 1990.
Because the u.s. economy is about 25 times
bigger than the Mexican economy, the net es-
timated gains in U.S. jobs from NAFTA are gen-
erally small. A study by Hufbauer and Schott
(1992) of the Institute for International Economics
(liE), which draws on 31 previous episodes of
economic liberalization to obtain estimates,
suggests that Mexican economic liberalization
(including NAFTA) will create 242,000 new
U.s. jobs, and displace about 112,000 existing U.S.
workers. This amounts to a net increase of130,000.
u.s. jobs, or slightly over 0.1 percent of 1991 U.S.
employment.
Estimates of employment gains obtained from
so-called computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models range from a low of 0.08 percent to a
high of2.5 percent above the no-NAFTA case.
CGE models simulate the impact of trade liberal-
ization by explicitly modeling consumption and
production decisions in various sectors. Although
theoretically more rigorous, the results of CGE
models are sensitive to the assumptions made
about the structure of the economy. Brown (1992)
surveys the results of CGE studies.
In contrast to the estimates of small u.s. job
gains, a widely publicized study by the Manufac-
turing Policy Project (tv\PP, 1992) estimates that
nearly six million U.s. manufacturing production
jobs are vulnerable because employers in these'
industries are expected to find relocation to Mex-
ico attractive under NAFTA. These six million
represent the total production employment in
firms where current labor costs account for more
than 20 percent of production costs. Such jobs
account for about one-third of the total U.s.
manufacturing jobs.
The MPP estimates are much larger than those
of other studies for at least two reasons. First, the
studies address different questions. The MPP
study seeks to identify the number of workers
that may be exposed to low-wage international
competition and concludes that this number is
potentially quite large. Thus, by its design, it
focuses on the potential gross impact of low-FRBSF
wage foreign competition on U.s. jobs, whereas
liE and CGE estimates focus on the net effects of
trade or economic liberalization in the two econ-
omies. In particular, the u.s. job gains associated
with increases in exports to Mexico, which will
offset job losses from relocation of u.s. firms to
Mexico, are not the subject of the MPP study.
Second, the MPP study implicitly assumes that as
a result of massive relocation of U.s. firms, Mex-
ico's economy will grow large enough to displace
a large number of U.s. workers. The liE and CGE
studies assume that Mexico will remain small rel-
ative to the u.s economy. This disagreement is
not easily resolved because the determinants of
the location of U.s. firms to Mexico are hard to
quantify.
Impact on U.S. wages
According to trade theory, closer trade links be-
tween an economy like the U.s., where capital
and skilled labor are relatively abundant, and an
economy like Mexico, where unskilled labor is
relatively abundant, would tend to have at least
two effects. First, U.S. production would shift to
those sectors that use relatively more capital and
less labor. This would tend to reduce the demand
for U.S. labor and decrease U.S. wages. Second,
the U.S. is likely to experience gains in skill-in-
tensive jobs and losses in relatively unskilled
jobs. As skilled workers are more productive and
are consequently paid more, the,reallocation of
jobs, and increased U.S. demand for skilled
workers, may increase average U.S. wages both
by raising the relative wages of skilled workers in
the u.s. and by inducing more U.s. workers to
increase their education and skill levels. Thus, it
is unclear whether average U.S. wages will rise
or fall in response to NAFTA. However, the
wages of u.s. workers who remain unskilled
will tend to fall.
A number of studies that address this question
generally estimate that NAFTA will have a pos-
itive, but very small, impact on average U.S.
wages. An important exception is an econo-
metric study by Leamer (1992), who finds that
the impact of NAFTA on U.S. real wages may be
quite large ifMexican productivity rises to levels
comparable to an industrial country like Italy.
Stressing the uncertainty of these estimates,
Leamer conjectures that NAFTA would raise the
wages of U.S. professional workers by roughly
$3000 a year, and reduce the wages of U.s. un-
skilied workers by nearly $1000 a year.
Two points may be made on the impact of
NAFTA on U.S. wages. First, as in the case of
job displacement, a key area of disagreement is
whether Mexico will become sufficiently large
(or productive) as a result of NAFTA to have a
major impact on the U.S., and whether the pro-
cess would be so sudden as to disrupt u.s. labor
markets. Second, the tendency for NAFTA to re-
duce the real wages of U.s. unskilled workers
will be offset to some degree if NAFTA improves
Mexico's ability to create jobs, thus easing im-
migration pressures on the U.S. labor market.
Mexican job creation and migration
Over the past decade, high unemployment in
Mexico's work force of 31 million people has
stimulated large inflows of unskilled Mexican
workers into the U.S. A recent study (Hinojosa-
Ojeda and Robinson, 1992) estimates that nearly
215,000 Mexicans a year migrated to the United
States in the 1980s, of which about 56 percent
were undocumented. By 1990, Mexican-born
workers in the u.s. totaled nearly 4.5 million,
about 3.6 percent of the u.s. labor force. Ex-
pected increases in the Mexican working age
population of about 1.3 million a year and the
displacement of workers as a result of Mexican
agricultural reform are likely to result in con-
tinued immigration pressures in the future. There
is some evidence that such immigration puts
downward pressure on the wages of unskilled
workers in the U.S. (Borjas, et aI., 1992)
Mexico has relied heavily on its exports to the
u.s. to create jobs for its workers. In 1990, ex-
ports to the U.s. constituted roughly 13 percent
of Mexican GDP. By further enhancing such ac-
cess and hence Mexico's job creation capabilit'yj
NAFTA could attenuate immigration pressures
and alleviate downward pressure on U.s. wages.
The liE study projects a gain to Mexicoof609,000
jobs, about 2.5 percent of the jobs available in
1990. Estimates based on CGE models range
from a low of0.33 percent (compared to the no-
NAFTA case) if it is assumed that only tariffs will
be cut under NAFTA, to a high of 6.6 percent if it
is assumed that both tariff and non-tariff barriers
are lifted and that capital inflows to Mexico in-
crease (Brown, 1992). These increases in Mexi-
can job creation are not expected to result in net
reductions in U.s. jobs because of the offsetting
increases in the Mexican demand for U.S. goods
cited earlier, and because the U.S. and Mexico
are expected to specialize in different types of
products.NAFTA in perspective
In the short run, NAFTA is likely to produce
relatively modest direct gains for the u.s. by in-
creasing the demand for u.s. goods and by re-
ducing immigration pressures. In the long run,
the benefits to the u.s. of having a vigorous and
prosperous Mexican neighbor are likely to be
larger.
Given the modest short-term gains, the concern
that NAFTA may have some adverse effects on
u.s. labor markets is understandable. However,
these concerns should be viewed from the per-
spective of the U.s. ongoing experience in meet-
ing the challenges of international competition.
Even in the absence of NAHA, the U.s. and
other industrial countries compete in an inter-
national environment where skilled labor is rela-
tively scarce, and unskilled labor is in excess
supply. In spite of its high labor costs, the u.s.
manufacturing sector has successfully main-
tained its international competitiveness through
technical innovations that increase worker pro-
ductivity, but that also require a more skilled
labor force. As a result, although international
competition has been associated with gains for
u.s. consumers and skilled workers, it has also
been associated with a steady erosion in the
availability of jobs requiring unskilled workers in
the U.s. manufacturing sector, and sharp declines
(nearly 18 percent between 1973 and 1985 for
workers without a high school degree, according
to Reich, 1992) in the real wages of unskilled
workers.
NAFTA is not likely to interrupt these broad
trends, but neither is it likely to accelerate them
significantly in the short fun. One reason is that
trade barriers between the u.s. and Mexico are
already quite low, and opportunities for u.s.
firms to invest in Mexico have existed for some
time. Another reason is that Mexico is small,
compared to both the u.s. economy, and more
importantly, to the combination of economies
that already compete in the u.s. market. Histor-
ical experience suggests that it will take time for
the Mexican economy to develop to the point
where it can have a large impact on the u.s.
market. If u.s. economic relations with devel-
oped economies are any indication, such a
process will yield significant benefits to the u.s.
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